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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant used a firearm or a facsimile of 
a firearm while robbing the Mountain America Credit Onion on 
February 28, 1986, when he pointed an object concealed in his 
pocket at the victim and said, "This is a robbery. Don't turn it 
into a homicide," and "If anyone tries to follow me, I will blast 
you." 
2. Whether the trial court instructed the jury as to 
the proper definition of "facsimile." 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
refusing to give a requested cautionary eyewitness instruction. 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : Case No. 860431 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Harry F. Suniville, was charged with 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Robbery in a jury 
trial held June 11, 1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Russon on 
July 7, 1986, to five years to life at the Utah State Prison to 
run consecutively with another sentence appellant was already 
serving (R. 11-14, 106-07). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 28, 1986, during the noon hour, a man 
entered the Mountain America Credit Union in Midvale, Utah. He 
wore a dark striped knitted ski mask over his face (R. 140), a 
long gold-yellow, parka-type hunting coat (R. 150), and blue 
jeans (R. 158). He went to bank teller Suzette Anderson's 
window. She observed that his right hand remained in the pocket 
of his coat (R. 140). He raised the pocket up over the counter 
above the window "like he had a gun" (R. 140). The teller 
observed, Mtlhere was something pointing at me in his pocket" 
(R. 140). The assailant then said, "This is a robbery. Don't 
turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money." (R. 140). 
As the teller opened her drawer, the robber said, "Big bills," 
and "I know about the bait money." (R. 141). As Suzette started 
going through the money, the man grabbed it with his left hand, 
put it in his left pocket, and headed toward the front door (R. 
141). When he got to the door, he stopped and said, "If anyone 
tries to follow me, I will blast you." (R. 141). He opened the 
door and went out heading west toward the parking lot (R. 144). 
As he left, his right hand remained in his coat pocket (R. 159). 
Ms. Anderson later filled out a police report giving 
her perception that the assailant had a gun (R. 154), although 
she never personally saw a gun (R. 152). At trial, she described 
the robber as a white male, 25-32 years old, six feet tall, 180-
200 pounds, with blue or green eyes and brown hair (R. 140, 147, 
149). She also noted that he walked with an unusual gait (he 
bounced while his feet scraped against the floor) (R. 142). 
Although she could not identify her assailant, she did note 
defendant's gait during the trial and said it was "very similar" 
to that of the robberfs (R. 142-43). 
Dan Parker, a construction worker, was eating his lunch 
in his truck just outside the credit union when he saw a man, 
whom he later identified as defendant (R. 169-70), exit the 
credit union wearing a blue knitted ski mask and a beige or gold 
mountaineer-type coat (R. 166-67, 174). The defendant pulled the 
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mask off as he ran directly in front of Parker (R. 167-175). His 
right hand was in the pocket of his coat (R. 177). Parker 
suspected a robbery and ran after the defendant shouting at him 
(R. 167-68). Defendant did not stop but continued to run through 
an underground parking area, jumped a short wall and got into a 
late 7Q's or early 80's dark brown Caraero (R. 169-70, 185) which 
was parked in an uncovered parking lot (R. 168) . As defendant 
reached his car, he looked directly at Parker (R. 169, 178-79). 
Parker subsequently identified defendant's photograph from photo 
spreads twice prior to trial (R. 191, 194, 196). He also 
identified defendant at a preliminary hearing and at trial (R. 
169, 196). Parker described the man he saw as being 20-30 years 
old, six feet tall, weighing 140 pounds and having brown hair (R. 
181-82). He said that during the incident defendant always kept 
his right hand in the pocket of the large beige coat he was 
wearing (R. 176-77). 
As defendant exited the credit union and pulled off his 
mask, he was also seen by Harry Barker and Jeffrey Hill who were 
working together just underneath the covered parking area (R. 
221). Barker saw defendant exit the building, pull off a dark 
blue or black ski mask, and hold it in his left hand, and start 
running directly toward them at a distance of 75 feet (R. 222, 
227). Barker alerted Hill to what was gong on (R. 222) . Barker 
observed defendant slow down as he came within 15 feet of them 
before he ran around them (R. 228-29). Barker even told the man, 
"You look like you just robbed a bank." (R. 223). Barker 
described the man as a white male, six feet tall, 160-170 pounds, 
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brown hair, clean shaven, wearing faded blue jeans, worn work 
boots, and a tan parka with a drawstring pulled tight below his 
belt (R. 230-32). He was also carrying something in his right 
hand1 and the mask in his left hand (R. 231-32). 
Barker positively identified defendant at trial as the 
person he had seen fleeing that day (R. 223-224). He had 
previously observed a photo spread and picked out two photos of 
persons who looked like the assailant. One was of the defendant 
(R. 224-25, 236-38; Defendant's Exhibit 5-D). 
Jeffrey Hill observed the defendant come off the stairs 
just outside the credit union (R. 203) and run toward them from a 
distance of 40 feet until he was 15 feet from them (R. 215). He 
described the man as five feet eleven inches tall, with brown 
hair, wearing a heavy coat (R. 203) .2 The man had both hands out 
of his pockets and was carrying a navy blue or black stocking in 
his left hand (R. 204, 215-16). He noted the man has the "same 
unusual type stride or walk" that defendant exhibited at trial 
(R. 206). Hill picked defendant's photograph out of a photo 
display (R. 207), and he positively identified defendant at trial 
as the man he had seen running from the credit union (R. 204, 
207) . 
1
 Barker testified as follows: "He had something in his right 
hand, but I couldn't tell what it was. I didn't know whether it 
was a gun or something else. I just couldn't tell what it was" 
(R. 231). 
2
 On direct examination, Hill was not sure of the color of the 
coat. However, on cross-examination he said it was "a greenish-
brown army color" or "khaki" (R. 216) . 
4-
Nick Dubois was also working in the area at noon on 
February 28th (R. 239). He heard someone yelling and saw other 
workmen running across the upper level of the parking lot toward 
him pointing and motioning (R. 240). He then saw someone run out 
from underneath the parking terrace (R. 240). The man had 
something in his hand (R. 241). Someone yelled, "the bank has 
been robbedi" (R. 240). Dubois then saw the man run across the 
lot and jump into a car (R. 242). Aware there had been a 
possible robberyr he watched the car "very closely" (R. 242). He 
described it as a chocolate brown Camero built between 1970-75 
with no license plate (R. 242-43). The chrome "beautifier" rims 
on the wheels of the car were all bent (R. 243, 250-51). 
Although he could not identify defendant, a week and a half after 
the robbery occurred, Dubois observed the same "chocolate brown 
Camero" parked in front of defendant's residence (R. 245-48). 
Defendant was later arrested while driving the same Camero (R. 
266). 
After the State rested, the defendant moved to dismiss 
or in the alternative, moved to reduce the charge to simple 
robbery on the theory that the state had failed to establish that 
a firearm, knife or facsimile of a firearm or knife or a deadly 
weapon had been used in the commission of the robbery as required 
by Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302(1)(a) (1953), as amended (R. 287-
96). Following argument, the motion was denied (R. 296). 
The defense requested an instruction defining facsimile 
as "an exact and precise copy, preserving all the marks of the 
original" (Defendant's requested instruction No. 6; R. 56). The 
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court refused the instruction and gave the prosecution1s 
requested instruction which read, "A facsimile of a firearm is 
any item or thing that by its appearance resembles a firearm." 
(Inst. No. 18; R. 72; cf. Prosecution's requested instruction No. 
7 (R. 47)). The defense also requested a limited form of a 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification which was 
refused by the court (Defendant's requested instruction No. 5; 
R. 55). The court did give general instructions on the 
credibility of witnesses (Instruction Nos. 6 and 10f R. 60f 64). 
All of the above instructions are set forth in Appendix A of this 
brief. The defense made timely objection to the court's refusal 
to give his requested instructions (R. 320-32). 
Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery on June 11, 1986 (R. 
83). On June 26, 1986, defendant moved to arrest judgment 
because Judge Russon had denied his request that a cautionary 
eyewitness instruction be given to the jury (R. 104). On July 7, 
1986, Judge Russon denied defendant's motion and sentenced him to 
five years to life at the Utah State Prison. This sentence was 
to run consecutively with a sentence defendant was already 
serving (R. 106). 
From this judgment and sentence defendant now appeals 
(R. 108). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant created a belief in the victim 
through words and actions that defendant truly did have a gun in 
his pocket and intended to use it, a facsimile of a firearm was 
effectively employed in the robbery. 
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The trial judge correctly instructed the jury as to the 
proper meaning of the term "facsimile." 
Finally, because this Court's decision in State v. 
LonQt 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), does not retroactively apply to 
appellant's case, the giving of cautionary instructions on 
eyewitness identification is left to the discretion of the trial 
judge, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 




THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT 
A FACSIMILE OF A FIREARM WAS USED IN THE 
ROBBERY. 
Defendant suggests there is no evidence that he used a 
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm while robbing the Mountain 
America Credit Union. 
While none of the witnesses actually saw a firearm and 
no gun was found, Suzette Anderson saw what she perceived to be a 
gun pointing at her from inside the defendant's right pocket. 
She also heard him say "don't turn it into a homicide" and "If 
anyone tries to follow me, I will blast you." It was her 
reasonable belief that defendant would shoot her if she did not 
quickly give him the money, and she even advised the 
investigating officers that her assailant had a gun (R. 140-41, 
154). 
Harry Barker also observed something in defendant's 
right hand as he ran past him, but Barker was unsure whether it 
was a gun (R. 231)• 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302(1) (1978), provides: 
(1) a person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: (a) 
uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firarm, 
knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly 
weapon . • . • 
The criminal code contains no definition of facsimile of a 
firearm. 
The lower court applied a subjective test to determine 
whether a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm was used in the 
robbery.^ The clear majority of jurisdictions that have 
considered this issue have supported this test and have held that 
the use of an unarmed robber's hand in such a way as to convey 
the impression that the robber is armed will bring the robbery 
within the statutes proscribing actual armed robbery. See State 
v. Hopson, 122 Wis.2d 395, 362 N.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1984), and all cases cited therein. 
The basic relationale behind the subjective test is 
twofold. First: 
[A] victim who is threatened with a supposed 
weapon which is concealed is put in the same 
degree of fear and feels as strongly 
compelled to comply with the robber's demands 
as a victim who is threatened with a weapon 
3 Judge Russon stated: Milt is the Court's belief and 
interpretation of the statute involved [76-6-302], and in light 
of State v. Turner, that when one uses any object with the intent 
to make the victim believe there is a gun and the victim 
reasonably could believe there is a gun, that whatever object is 
being used is, in fact, a facsimile of a firearm whether it is a 
piece of pipe in the pocket or a plastic gun or even a finger, if 
that is perceived by the victim as being a gun and is intended by 
the perpetrator to be a gun or to at least make the victim think 
it is a gun, I believe we have the elements necessary to meet 
requirements of aggravated armed robbery" (R. 296). 
- Q _ 
which is openly displayed,4 
Hopson, 362 N.W.2d at 169. And second: 
To find as a matter of law that where a gun 
is not seen a defendant cannot be convicted 
of the armed feature is to allow all would-be 
robbers to keep a gun or other dangerous 
weapon concealed during the crime to be used 
only if needed. To read the statute in this 
light 'would have the effect of placing it in 
the power of the transgressor to defeat the 
object and purpose of the law by evasion.1 
State v. Cooper. 140 N.J. Super. 28, 354 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976). See also, Breedlove v. State, 482 So. 
2d 1277, 1281-82 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Henderson, 34 
Wash. App. 865, 664 p.2d 1291, 1293 (1983). The sole concern 
with the subjective test is the possibility that a suspect might 
be convicted of aggravated (armed) robbery merely because the 
victim believed, without support for the belief, that the suspect 
might be armed. Hopson, 362 N.W.2d at 170. However, this Court 
may adopt a construction of the statute which requires, as 
occurred in this case, that the victim's belief be reasonable. 
Id-
Defendant contends that this Court has not adopted a 
subjective standard test to determine what constitutes a 
facsimile. However, in State v. Turner, 572 P.2d 387 (Utah 
1977), this Court quoted the definition of "facsimile" as found 
in Webster's New Unabridged Dictionary, 2d Edition, as: "1. Act 
of making copy, imitation" (Emphasis added). The Court then 
4
 It is clear that even a finger placed in the pocket in the 
shape of a gun when combined with the defendants threatening 
actions and/or words is capable of causing the victim to believe 
the defendant is armed. 
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cited People v. Delgardo, 1 Misc. 2d 821, 146 N.Y.S.2d 350, 356 
(1955) as an explanation for the word imitation: 
The word imitation when applied to pistols 
and revolvers means so nearly resembling the 
genuine as to mislead, with the apparent 
object of producing, and likely to produce, 
upon the minds of those against whom it is to 
be used, the belief that the imitation weapon 
is capable of producing all the injurious 
consequences to the victim as the use of the 
genuine article itself. 
When defendant raised an object concealed in his pocket 
over the teller's counter and pointed it at the victim while 
exclaiming "don't turn it into a homicide,11 and later said, "I 
will blast you," it is clear he wanted Ms. Anderson to believe he 
was armed with a weapon. Defendant's words and actions produced 
this belief in the victim and placed the robbery within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)(a). 
The evidence established that defendant used a 
facsimile of a firearm. Therefore, his conviction for armed 
robbery was proper. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
ON THE CORRECT DEFINITION OF "FACSIMILE". 
Judge Russon gave the jury the following definition of 
facsimile as instruction number 18: 
A facsimile of a firearm is any item or thing 
that by its appearance resembles a firearm 
(R. 72) . 
Defendant contends that his requested instruction also 
needed to be given to the jury to correct the vague and imprecise 
nature of instruction no. 18 (See Appellant's Brief at 11). His 
requested instruction states in pertinent part: 
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A facsimile is defined as an exact and 
precise copy, preserving all the marks of the 
original. 
(R. 56). He cites this Court's decision in Turner as supporting 
his position. The lower court in Turner gave two facsimile 
instructions to the jury (instruction nos. 11 and 12). 
Instruction no. 11 was similar to defendant's requested 
instruction in the instant case: 
You are instructed that a facsimile is 
defined as: an exact and precise copy of 
anything. An exact reproduction, for 
example, the signature reproduced by a rubber 
stamp. 
State v. Turner, 572 P.2d at 389. Instruction no. 12, which is 
substantially the same as the court's instruction no. 18 in the 
case at bar, reads: 
You are further instructed that a facsimile 
of a firearm is any instrument that by its 
appearance resembles a firearm. 
The defendant in Turner asserted, as does defendant in 
the present case, that instruction no. 11 was acceptable but that 
instruction no. 12 "expands the meaning of 'facsimile' beyond its 
proper definition." Id. This Court, however, did not agree. It 
found "the Ilower] court's instruction no. 12 to be a 'sensible 
interpretation' of the statutory language." Id. 
The Court was primarily concerned that instruction no. 
11 would conflict with the "sensible" instruction no. 12 and 
create confusion and vagueness. This Court, however, "did not 
perceive sufficient tension between the definitions of 
•facsimile1 in instruction nos. 11 and 12 to constitute defective 
vagueness." Id. 
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Applying Turner to the instant casef the lower court's 
instuction no, 18 was "a sensible interpretation of the statutory 
language." No additional facsimile instruction needed to be 
given to correct any supposed vagueness or imprecision. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
Defendant was tried and convicted of aggravated robbery 
on June 11, 1986. Nine days laterr this Court in State v. Long, 
721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), required that from the day Long was 
filed (June 20, 1986), judges were to give cautionary jury 
instructions on eyewitness identification whenever such an 
instruction is requested by the defendant and when eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in the case. £d. at 492.5 
Six days after Long was decided, defendant filed a 
motion to arrest judgment because the judge had refused to give 
defendant's requested cautionary instruction at trial (R. 104, 
321) .*> On July 7, 1986, defendant's motion was denied and he was 
sentenced (R. 106). 
5
 Prior to Long, this Court had held that the giving of such 
cautionary instructions was to be left to the discretion of the 
trial court. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 346 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (Utah 1985). 
^ The scope of defendant's so-called cautionary instruction was 
very limited (See Defendant's requested instruction no. 5, R. 55, 
set forth in Appendix A). It merely advised the jury that the 
state had the burden of proving identity beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and noted that identification testimony depends on the 
opportunity of the witness to observe the offender at the time of 
the offense and make a reliable identification later. It did not 
purport to "advise the jury as to the potential difficulties of 
eyewitness identification" or "comport in substance with the type 
of jury instruction that this court mandated in Long" 
(Appellant's brief at 14-15). 
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Defendant contends that it would be arbitrarily unjust 
to exclude him from receiving Long's benefits simply because his 
verdict and conviction were rendered nine days before Long was 
decided especially since he was not sentenced until July 7, 1986 
(Appellant's Brief at 16). 
This Court specifically intended that Long be applied 
prospectively: 
We therefore today abandon our discretionary 
approach to cautionary instructions and 
direct that in cases tried from this day 
forward, trial courts shall give such an 
instruction whenever eye-witness identifica-
tion is a central issue in a case and such an 
instruction is requested by the defense. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (emphasis added). The relevant 
language could be read in a reasonable, common sense manner as 
cases commenced from this day forward. At most, the term "tried 
from this day forward" might be construed to accommodate cases 
commenced before Long, but where the jury was not yet instructed. 
But the language should not be tortured to cover cases like the 
instant one, where the jury had already rendered its verdict and 
had been dismissed. 
This case was in fact tried before Long was decided. 
Both sides had rested, the jury had rendered its verdict and had 
been excused. It would not have been reasonable or practical to 
reconvene the jury and ask them to reconsider their verdict in 
light of Long, and give them a detailed cautionary instruction on 
eyewitness identification. Nor would it have been necessary 
given the corroborative evidence in this case. 
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Defendant claims that any refusal to accord him the 
retroactive benefit of Long would be arbitrary, However, it is 
well-established that the federal constitution "neither prohibits 
nor requires" retroactivity of state judicial decisions. 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618r 629 (1965); Great Northern 
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 
(1932). Rather, "Itlhe federal constitution has no voice upon 
the subject" and the Supreme Court has left the states to develop 
their own rules on retroactivity: "a state in defining the limits 
of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between 
the principle of forward operation and that of relation 
backward." Sunburst Oil, 287 U.S. at 364. Thus, either choice 
affords due process of law. 16. at 363-64. £f. Andrews v. 
Morris, 677 P.2d 81 (Utah 1983) (refusing to extend retroactive 
benefit of State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 
469 U.S. 988 (1982), to cases already final; and State v. Norton, 
675 P.2d 577, 583-84 (Utah 1983), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 
(1984) (according retroactive benefit of Wood to cases not yet 
final) . 
Finally, defendant claims that even if the pre-Long 
standard of this Court is applicable to his case, it was an abuse 
of the trial court's discretion not to give his requested 
instruction. In a post-Long case which was tried before Long was 
decided, this Court held that judicial discretion could be used 
to decide if a cautionary instruction should be given: 
[Tlhe Long decision was specifically limited 
in its application to cases tried after its 
date of issuance. Trial of the present case 
preceded Long, and therefore defendant's 
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claim must be evaluated under prior case law 
to determine whether the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to give the 
required cautionary instruction. 
State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah 1986). 
In Jonas, this Court ruled that the trial judge abused 
his discretion by not giving the requested cautionary 
instruction. However, Jonas is easily distinguishable from the 
instant case. In Jonas there was a solitary eyewitness, the 
victim, who observed his assailant for only an instant before 
being stuck in the ribs with a handgun and knocked unconscious. 
The victim was attacked at night and appeared to be uncertain as 
to the location of the assault and the identity of the 
perpetrator. The instant case is more comparable to this 
Court's recent decision in State v. Quevado, Utah, No. 19049 
(March 26, 1987). In Quevado. this Court held that the lower 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a 
cautionary instruction when the defendant was convicted based 
upon the testimony of four eyewitnesses and the identification of 
the jacket the defendant wore when arrested as the same jacket 
worn by the fleeing suspect. £d. at 3. See also, State v. 
Remington, Utah, No. 86031 (March 31, 1987). 
In the case at bar, there were three eyewitnesses who 
identified defendant as the person they saw running from the 
credit union at noon on February 28, 1986. All three 
eyewitnesses observed defendant for far more than a few seconds 
at a relatively close distance. They all paid close attention to 
what they saw since they suspected foul play. 
-is-
There was also corroborating evidence to support the 
eyewitness identification. A witness positively identified 
defendant's car as the same vehicle used in the robbery7 and the 
victim and another eyewitness in this case observed that 
defendant virtually had the same distinctive gait as the 
assailant. 
This case is similar to other pre-Long cases in that 
"it is highly likely that the result would have been exactly the 
same even if a cautionary instrution had been given." Jonas, at 
1380. 
Moreover, in his closing argument, defense counsel 
fully presented the critical factors in eyewitness identification 
which lasted for a total of 13 pages in the transcript (R. 336-
49). Thus, the jury was sufficiently alerted to the possibility 
of error in eyewitness identification. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
DATED this 16 day of April, 19 87. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
^ This Court held in Quevado that the identification of the 
defendant's jacket was "not so subject to error as the 
identification of a person". Id. at 3. 
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